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Prisoners' Dilemma

"Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction" (with Jack Ochs), forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior. Download the dataset.

We report results from an experiment that examines play in an indefinitely repeated, two-player Prisoner's Dilemma game. Each experimental session involves N subjects and a sequence of indefinitely repeated games. The main treatment consists of whether agents are matched in fixed pairings or matched randomly in each indefinitely repeated game. Within the random matching treatment, we elicit player's strategies and beliefs or vary the information that players have about their opponents. Contrary to a theoretical possibility suggested by Kandori (1992), a cooperative norm does not emerge in the treatments where players are matched randomly. On the other hand, in the fixed pairings treatment, the evidence suggests that a cooperative norm does emerge as players gain more experience.


Figure 1, crose x is the random marching games with 14 subjects, green o is the random marching with 6 subjects,
orgene triangle is the fix marching with 6 subjects, and the blue dots are fix marching 14 subjects.
Figure 2, related records from the Excel files from the dataset of John Duffy(2009), It hints that, the recordset from 020307.xls is interesting.
Go back to the beginning, Why we analysis Duffy's data? We get above figures from the hint of our result as following
the label of "++" denote the cooperation phase, and the "--" denote the defection phase.
 We argute that, fluctuation is an important measureable parameter in human subject experiments.  
Detail should be reported in the conference 2009 Europe ESA Innsbruck Austria (17-20 September 2009).

Presentation List

Title Conference Presenter Author(s) Status View
Phase Diagram of Prisoner Dilemma: Empirical Evidence from the Human Subjects Experiments 2009 Europe ESA Innsbruck Austria Bin Xu Xu Bin, Cheng Qiqi, Wang Zhijian Accepted

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