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Comment : Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction(Duffy聽And Ochs 2009)
July 30, 2009
Abstract:聽聽聽聽聽聽
In this short comment, we report our observation of an anomaly in the raw data of Duffy and聽Ochs (2009) and describe a possible method for examining experimental data consistency in聽Prisoner Dilemma experiments, and possibly other experiments.
Submit on聽Games and Economic Behavior, July 30, 2009

Phase Diagram of Prisoner's Dilemma: Empirical Evidence from the Human Subjects Experiments
May 30, 2009
Abstract:聽聽聽聽聽聽
This paper presents the empirical phase diagram showing the cooperation phase, the mixed phase and the defection phase of prisoner鈥檚 dilemma experiment. The empirical data includes 21 experiments using a total of 350 human subjects. Experimental parameters are the possibility of continuation within [0, 1], the sizes of population within [12, 24], and a prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix (S, R, T, P) = (-2, 2, 4, 0). Twenty-one different combinations of these parameters were used in the experiments. The results provide the first empirical instance for Folk Theorem.

Keywords:聽phase diagram, repeated prisoner鈥檚 dilemma, fixed and random matching model, experimental economics

JEL Classifications:聽C72, C73, C91, C92

Working Paper Series http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1412086
Accepted by聽ESA 2009 Innsbruck, European regional meeting: Innsbruck, Austria, 17-20 September 2009聽, presented by Xu Bin

Behavior Phase Diagram of the Prisoners' Dilemma
Xu Bin, Cheng Qiqi, Wang Zhijian

Abstract: We conducted a series of experiments in which subjects played a repeated prisoners' dilemma game with different probabilities of continuation. We found that the relationship between the probability of continuation and the quantile regression slope (showing the final payoff and the percentage of cooperation being used as a strategy) is that as the probability increases, the value of quantile regression slope increases also and vice versa. Even more, the theory that, with a given population size, there exists a certain value of probability of continuation, upon which a cooperation equilibrium will be reliably produced (Kandori 1992), was accurately supported by the data from our experiments.

Keywords:聽Cooperation, Marching, Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Experimental Design

JEL Classifications:聽C71, C73, C91, C92

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1329844
聽Update by
Phase Diagram of Prisoner's Dilemma: Empirical Evidence from the Human Subjects Experimentshttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1412086


鍋忓ソ琛ㄨ揪鐨勬瀬鍖栧拰浜虹兢鐨勫垎瑁 鈥曗曞熀浜庡甫鏈夆滅ぞ浼氶夋嫨鈥濇満鍒剁殑鍏叡鍝佸崥寮堝疄楠岀殑璇佹嵁
璁稿浆 璐炬嫢姘 鐜嬪織鍧

鎽樿
:聽璁稿鏂囩尞琛ㄦ槑锛屾儵缃氭満鍒跺彲浠ユ彁楂樼ぞ浼氬悎浣滄按骞炽傜劧鑰岋紝澶栫敓鐨勬儵缃氬埗搴︿笉鑳藉弽鏄犵兢浣撶殑鍋忓ソ銆傚埗搴︾殑纭畾涓鑸氳繃鎶曠エ鍐冲畾銆傛垜 浠璁′簡涓涓厛鐢变釜浜烘姇绁紝鍐嶅涓汉鎶曠エ缁撴灉姹傗滃钩鍧囧尖濓紝骞朵互姝ゆ潵纭畾鎯╃綒鍒跺害鐨勫叕鍏卞搧鍗氬紙瀹為獙銆傝瀹為獙鍦ㄤ竴涓叿澶囧叕鍏卞搧鍗氬紙鐭ヨ瘑鐨勪汉缇や腑灞曞紑銆傛湰鏂囨姤鍛婅瀹為獙鐨勫疄楠屾柟娉曪紝涓昏缁撹浠ュ強鐩稿叧鐨勮閲忔柟娉曘傝繖涓瀹為獙鐨勪富瑕佺粨鏋滄槸锛氳櫧鐒朵釜浜哄鎯╃綒鍒跺害鐨勫亸濂藉彲鑳芥槸鐩稿绋冲畾鐨勶紝浣嗘槸锛屽湪涓瀹氱殑瑙勫垯绾︽潫涓嬶紝涓汉琛ㄨ揪鍋忓ソ鏃朵細鍙戠敓涓ラ噸鐨勫亸绂伙紝褰㈡垚瀵圭珛鐨勭兢浣擄紝骞跺鑷寸ぞ浼氱殑鍒嗚.
鍏抽敭璇嶏細鎶曠エ 鏋佸寲 鍒嗚 鍏叡閫夋嫨 缁忔祹瀛︽枃鐚垎绫诲彿锛欳91,C92

鎯╃綒鏄悎浣滃舰鎴愮殑鏈夋晥鏈哄埗鍚楋紵鈥斺 鍩轰簬鍏叡鍝佸崥寮堝疄楠岀殑楠岃瘉聽
璁稿浆 绋嬪濂 鑼冭壇鑱 缃楀崼涓 鐜嬪織鍧 姹竵涓

鎽樿锛鎯╃綒鏄悎浣滃舰鎴愮殑鍏抽敭锛岃繖涓鐐瑰湪鏈杩20骞翠腑閫愭鎴愪负鍏辫瘑銆傜劧鑰岋紝鏈杩Nowak鐮旂┒灏忕粍閫氳繃涓缁勫甫鎯╃綒閫夐」鐨勫洑寰掑洶澧冨崥寮堝疄楠屽杩欎竴鍏辫瘑鎻愬嚭缃枒锛岃灏忕粍鎸囧嚭锛屾儵缃氭満鍒剁殑浣跨敤鑰呬笉鍏峰婕斿寲浼樺娍锛屽洜鑰屼粠闀挎湡鐪嬶紝鎯╃綒涓嶅彲鑳芥垚涓哄悎浣滃舰鎴愮殑鏈哄埗銆傝繖涓缃枒鏄瀬鍏锋寫鎴樻х殑锛屽洜鑰屽叾缁撹鐨勫彲闈犳т互鍙婃槸鍚﹀叿鏈変竴鑸у氨闇瑕佸緱鍒拌繘涓姝ョ殑妫楠屻傞氳繃鍏叡鍝佸崥寮堝疄楠岋紝鎴戜滑鍦ㄥ浐瀹氫紮浼村拰闅忔満浼欎即涓ょ鎯呭舰涓嬶紝鍦ㄤ釜浣撱佸皬缁勫拰鈥滅ぞ浼氣濅笁涓眰闈笂锛岄噰鐢ㄤ笌Nowak鐮旂┒灏忕粍鐩稿悓鐨勮閲忔柟娉曪紝楠岃瘉骞跺己鍖栦簡Nowak灏忕粍鐨勭爺绌剁粨璁猴紝鍦ㄦ洿鍔犱竴鑸殑鎰忎箟涓婂緱鍒颁簡鎯╃綒涓嶅叿婕斿寲浼樺娍锛屼粠鑰岄毦浠ュ湪闀挎湡鍐呮垚涓哄悎浣滃舰鎴愭満鍒剁殑缁撹銆

鍏抽敭璇嶏細鍏叡鍝佸崥寮 琛屼负瀹為獙 鎯╃綒鏈哄埗 绀句細涓ら毦 鍥氬緬鍥板鍗氬紙 聽聽缁忔祹瀛︽枃鐚垎绫诲彿锛C91,C92

Punishers are not the Winners: Evidence from Public Goods Game Experiments
Xu Bin, Cheng Qiqi, Fan Liangcong, Luo Weidong, Wang Zhijian & Wang Dingding

Abstract: Punishment was treated as the key factor in promoting cooperation, which gradually became the basic consensus in the last 20 years. However, evidence from Prisoner鈥檚 Dilemma Game (Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg and Nowak, Nature, 2008) shows that there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and the usage of costly punishment and hence punishment is opposed by individual selection. This result is extremely challenging, therefore the reliability and the generality need to be further tested. Through laboratory Public Goods Game, both with fixed partner groups and stranger groups, we validate and strengthen the Nowak鈥檚 result in the individual level, group level and the 鈥渟ocial鈥 level. Employing the same method as Nowak鈥檚, our results indicate that punishment might have no superiority in evolution in a general sense, thereby becomes difficult in the long-term cooperation mechanism.

Keywords: Public Goods Game; Behavior Experiment; Punishment Mechanism; Social Dilemma; Prisoners鈥 Dilemma Game 聽聽Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes C91, C92

http://www.cenet.org.cn/article.asp?articleid=33171


缁欎簣鍜屾儵缃氱殑闈炲绉版 --- 鍩轰簬鍏叡鍝佸崥寮堝疄楠岀殑楠岃瘉
璁稿浆 鑼冭壇鑱 绋嬪濂 鐜嬪織鍧

鎽樿锛氬熀浜庡墠浜虹殑鏈夊叧鐮旂┒锛屾垜浠埄鐢ㄥ叕鍏卞搧瀹為獙鍦ㄤ竴涓洿骞跨殑鍙傛暟鑼冨洿涓庢洿澶х殑鏍锋湰涓帰璁ㄤ簡鍏充簬鎯╃綒涓庣粰浜堣繖涓ょ鏈哄埗鍦ㄤ汉绫诲悎浣滆繃绋嬩腑濡備綍璧蜂綔鐢ㄣ傛垜浠彂鐜颁簡涓绯诲垪鐨勨滈潪瀵圭О鎬р濓細鍙備笌鑰呭缁欎簣鍜屾儵缃氭満鍒跺亸濂界殑闈炲绉帮紱缁欎簣鍜屾儵缃氬瀹炴柦鎴愭湰鐨勫弽搴旂殑闈炲绉帮紱缁欎簣鍜屾儵缃氭満鍒朵笅鍙備笌鑰呮崘鐚噺鐨勯潪瀵圭О锛涚粰浜堝拰鎯╃綒瀹炴柦瀵瑰紩鑷存崘鐚奖鍝嶇殑闈炲绉帮紱缁欎簣鍜屾儵缃氳涓哄湪瀹為獙涓紨鍖栫殑闈炲绉帮紝绛夌瓑銆傝繖浜涢潪瀵圭О鎴愪负褰卞搷瀹為獙涓汉鐨勫喅绛栫殑閲嶈渚濇嵁銆傛垨璁革紝姝f槸杩欎簺鈥滈潪瀵圭О鎬р濈殑瀛樺湪浣垮緱缁欎簣杩欎竴鐪嬩技鍏锋湁鏁堢巼浼樺娍鐨勬満鍒跺苟娌℃湁鏄剧ず鍑鸿秴鍑烘儵缃氱殑浼樿秺鎬э紝浣垮緱鎯╃綒杩欎竴鈥滄病鏈夋紨鍖栦紭鍔库濈殑鏈哄埗寰椾互瀛樺湪銆偮犅犅
鍏抽敭璇嶏細鍏叡鍝佸崥寮堬紱鎯╃綒锛涚粰浜堬紱闈炲绉版

Asymmetries of Giving and Punishment: Evidence from Experiment of Public Goods Games
Xu Bin, Fan Liangcong, Cheng Qiqi & Wang Zhijian

Abstract: We examined the effects of punishment and giving mechanism on provisions of public goods employing experiment of public goods games with fixed partners in an enlarged parameter of giving proportion and sample. Our results showed out many asymmetries quantitatively, including asymmetry of subjects鈥 preference on punishment versus giving, asymmetry of responses to alternative cost structures of punishment versus giving, asymmetry of subjects鈥 contributions in punishment versus giving mechanism, asymmetry of induced contributions after receiving punishment versus giving, as well as asymmetry of dynamic of punishment versus giving. All these asymmetries are basis of subjects鈥 decision making. May the asymmetries illustrate the insuperiority of giving mechanism and the superiority of punishment, although giving seems more efficient than punishment.聽
Keywords: Public Goods Game锛汸unishment锛汫iving锛汚symmetry聽 Economic Literature (JEL) codes C91, C92

http://www.cenet.org.cn/article.asp?articleid=33171


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